Pro-Iran media in Iraq amplifies narratives that legitimize AOR militias in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), exacerbate public anxiety over a potential resurgence of Sunni jihadism in Iraq, and frame Western and Turkish influence in Iraq and Syria as destabilizing. These sources characterize Syria’s transitional government as a puppet of Turkey and repeatedly accuse Damascus of human rights abuses, especially toward Shia Alawites. Amplification of these narratives is strategically aimed at arousing fear among Iraqis, possibly to justify future intervention in Syria or attacks on Turkish military installments in Iraq. However, some lulls in coverage suggest a strategic pause as Tehran assesses Syria’s evolving political landscape to identify potential leverage points. In contrast, Sunni and liberal Iraqi sources actively challenge Tehran’s influence by framing Syria’s transition as a step toward stability and regional reintegration.
(Figure 1) EdgeTheory Geospatial Narrative Mapping: Narratives amplified by pro-Iran sources in Iraq
Pro-Iran Narratives on Regional Intervention:
Overall, pro-Iran narratives on Western and Turkish regional intervention are designed to invoke nationalist sentiments, potentially to justify future kinetic or political actions targeting foreign interests in Iraq.
Pro-Iran Narratives on Syria’s Transition:
Overall, pro-Iran narratives on Syria’s transition are designed to stoke fear among Iraqis, potentially to gauge or rally public support for future AOR intervention in Syria.
Sunni and Liberal Narratives:
Overall, Sunni and liberal narratives are designed to counter dominant pro-Iran narratives in Iraq, but domestically headquartered outlets are often more cautious in their narrative framing, potentially to avoid censorship.
In 2011, popular discontent among Syria’s Sunni majority sparked widespread demonstrations against the authoritarian rule of Iran-backed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki–notable for his political marginalization of Iraqi Sunnis during his tenure–condemned the uprising, fearing that jihadist groups among the Syrian rebels would embolden similar factions in Iraq. As the conflict in Syria evolved into a full-fledged civil war, Iraq was one of few states not to close its embassy in Damascus.
In 2012, several Iraqi AOR militias flocked to Syria to fight in support of Assad’s regime, justifying their presence with the stated aim of defending Shi'ite holy sites. These militias were part of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance”, a network of Iran-backed Shia militias committed to furthering Iran’s strategic interests in the region. AOR militias are directly supported by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force. Other notable AOR forces include Lebanese Hezbollah and the Houthi movement in Yemen.
When Islamic State jihadists declared a caliphate stretching from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq in 2014, many Iraqi AOR militiamen withdrew from Syria to defend their home territory. Maliki responded by announcing the establishment of the Popular Mobilization Forces, an official Iraqi state security service established as an attempt to exert government control over new and pre-existing militias that had emerged to fight ISIS. The PMF’s establishment institutionalized the power of AOR militias such as US-designated terrorist groups Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH1), Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HaN), and the Badr Organization, enabling them to exploit Iraqi state resources for their operations.
In 2015, Iraq entered into a joint intelligence-sharing coalition with Syria, Iran, and Russia to combat ISIS in both Iraq and Syria. The majority of Iraqi AOR militiamen remaining in Syria gradually withdrew between 2018 and 2019 as Assad’s forces–backed by Russian airpower and Lebanese Hezbollah–regained control of key cities. By the time ISIS was territorially defeated in 2020, Assad had reclaimed most of Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the PMF had grown into a force nearly half the size of the Iraqi army and consolidated considerable institutional power in Iraq.
In 2021, AOR-affiliated political parties banded together to establish Iraq’s ruling coalition, the Shia Coordination Framework. The CF’s establishment further increased Tehran’s influence over Iraqi political affairs. Over the next three years, the Iraqi government steadily strengthened bilateral ties with the Assad regime.
While the war between Assad and the Syrian opposition carried on, its front lines remained largely frozen until late November 2024, when opposition forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and supported by Turkey launched a lightning offensive that toppled the Assad regime in less than two weeks.
At the start of the 2024 offensive, many observers expected Iran to mobilize AOR forces in Iraq to intervene as it did in 2012. However, the situation in Iraq and Syria looked vastly different than it did twelve years prior. Monitoring shifts in pro-Iran narratives will thus be critical for assessing Tehan’s evolving strategy for maintaining its regional influence post-Assad.
The Iraqi media environment is heavily influenced by politically affiliated outlets that often propagate party-aligned narratives and occasionally disseminate false information for political gain. Media outlets linked to AOR militias and/or the CF perpetuate pro-Iran narratives, while Sunni and liberal sources often challenge Tehran’s influence. However, state media regulation is biased in favor of Iran. Iraq’s official Communications and Media Commission (CMC) board of directors has been dominated by the CF since October 2024, when current Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani removed all non-Shiite members from its board. On the day the Syrian rebels captured Damascus, the CMC issued directives to all Iraqi media outlets encouraging them to praise the PMF and counter the “media onslaught of the usurping Zionist entity”. While such directives are technically non-binding, the CMC has previously demonstrated power to restrict freedom of speech and prevent Iraqi news outlets from featuring critics of Tehran’s influence on Iraqi institutions.
1. Pro-Iran sources often counter Western narratives by portraying Iran’s adversaries as unwanted interveners in Iraqi affairs. For example, pro-Iran sources harshly condemned US Senator Joe Wilson’s proposed legislation to designate additional AOR militias as foreign terrorist organizations:
(Figure 2) Tweet: US Senator Joe Wilson accuses the Badr Organization of terrorism
In a rare acknowledgment of accusations, Badr-run news outlet Al Ghadeer responded to Wilson’s statements directly, calling them baseless and accusing Wilson of ignoring Badr’s role in driving ISIS out of Iraq. The outlet also emphasized that Iraq “does not need American taxpayer money” and suggested Wilson “focus on addressing internal issues in his country”:
(Figure 3) Telegram: AAH-run Al Ghadeer responds to US Senator Joe Wilson’s accusations of terrorism
Interestingly, KSS-affiliated outlet Al Anwar TV posted an article highlighting Badr’s rejection of Wilson’s claims but did not directly defend KSS itself, which Wilson also suggested should be designated an FTO in a later tweet. This selective response suggests an effort to amplify the narrative that AOR PMF militias are legitimate government security forces without drawing additional scrutiny to KSS. In analyzing such media dynamics, access to accurate translations is essential for identifying subtle shifts in messaging and strategic omissions. Edgetheory’s aligned messaging tool can help make foreign language sources accessible, without relying on often imprecise direct translations:
(Figure 4) Sentiment Analysis: KSS-affiliated Al Anwar TV defends Badr
By selectively responding to Wilson’s statements, pro-Iran sources strategically deflect attention away from more controversial AOR factions while bolstering the legitimacy of Badr, which enjoys greater political influence. The differing levels of engagement from pro-Iran media in defending AOR factions suggest an effort to shield more controversial groups from additional scrutiny while maintaining a broader narrative of resistance against US influence.
2. Pro-Iran sources often criticize Turkey’s growing influence in Iraq and Syria, reflecting growing regional competition between Ankara and Tehran. For example:
KSS-affiliated Al Anwar TV interprets Turkey’s installation of 16 communication towers along the Iraq-Turkey border as a concerning military encroachment and an assertion of Turkish control over Iraqi territory, promoting the narrative that Turkey seeks to expand its territorial influence under the guise of counterterrorism operations:
(Figure 5) Sentiment Analysis: KSS-affiliated Al Anwar TV criticizes Turkish military expansion in Iraq
Similarly, Badr-run Al Ghadeer highlights calls for Iraqi parliament to address the expansion of Turkish military presence in Iraq on the pretext of fighting the PKK, accusing Ankara of taking advantage of the fragile political and security situation in Northern Iraq:
(Figure 6) Sentiment Analysis: Badr-run Ghadeer criticizes Turkish military expansion in Iraq
Pro-Iran outlet Buratha News likewise portrays Turkey as a destabilizing force in Iraq, emphasizing the human cost of Turkish airstrikes and framing Ankara’s military actions as reckless and harmful to Iraqi sovereignty. Linking these airstrikes to Turkish diplomatic visits promotes the narrative that Ankara uses military aggression as a tool to exert political pressure on Iraq and the KRG:
(Figure 7) Sentiment Analysis: pro-Iran Buratha News criticizes Turkish airstrikes in Iraq
AAH-run Al Ahad appeals to a Kurdish audience by highlighting Turkey’s strategic intervention in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, portraying it as a means to manipulate internal Kurdish politics:
(Figure 8) Sentiment Analysis: AHH-run Al Ahad criticizes Turkish influence over the KRG
Turning to Turkish influence in Syria, HaN-run Al Nujaba TV accuses Turkey and Qatar of undermining local governance in Syria by prioritizing their own interests over Syria’s sovereignty and long-term stability. By framing Turkey and Qatar as “neo-imperialist” actors, this narrative aims to delegitimize both the Turkish-backed Syrian interim government and Qatari diplomatic efforts:
(Figure 9) Sentiment Analysis: HaN-run Al Nujaba TV criticizes Turkish and Qatari Influence in Syria
Pro-Iran outlet Press TV Iraq similarly frames Turkey’s engagement with HTS and its military expansion in Syria as a destabilizing power play. This narrative presents Turkey as a disruptive force seeking to shift the regional balance of power in its favor:
(Figure 10) Sentiment Analysis: Iranian outlet Press TV Iraq criticizes Turkish military expansion in Syria
In an interview with AAH-run Al Ahad, AAH leader Qais al-Khazali explicitly accuses Turkey of seeking to "redraw the borders for the Erdogan Empire”, linking Turkey’s military incursions in northern Iraq and Syria as part of a broader neo-Ottoman expansionist agenda. These statements came days after his weeks-long stay in Iran following the fall of the Assad regime, suggesting that this narrative is closely aligned with Tehran’s interests:
(Figure 11) Al Ahad interview: AAH leader Qais al-Khazali criticizes Turkish Influence in Iraq and Syria
Overall, sources run by/affiliated with pro-Iran AOR militias follow a similar amplification pattern when reporting on kinetic events involving Turkey, pointing to a coordinated media strategy aimed at reinforcing a unified anti-Turkish narrative:
(Figure 12) Timeline: Militia-affiliated Narrative Amplifications on Turkish Military Action
The overall spike on January 26th reflects reporting on Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan’s meetings with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad to discuss Turkish operations against the SDF in northern Syria amid recent kinetic incidents at the Turkey‑Iraq border and reports of an agreement between Turkey and PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. However, KSS-affiliated Al Anwar TV deviated from this pattern on February 8th against the backdrop of intensified Turkish kinetic operations targeting senior PKK leaders in Iraq and Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s return from diplomatic talks in Ankara:
This spike not only included Al Anwar TV’s reports on the operations themselves, but also other narrative items spreading misinformation and harshly condemning Turkish military expansion more generally. This surge in reporting on February 8th indicates an intentional unilateral media effort by KSS to draw attention to the potential dangers of Turkey’s broader geopolitical ambitions in Iraq and Syria. For example:
Al Anwar TV accused Turkey of training Iraqi ISIS fighters in Syria on February 8th, linking Iraqi fears of an ISIS resurgence to Turkish military operations:
(Figure 13) Sentiment Analysis: KSS-affiliated Al Anwar TV accuses Turkey of training ISIS militants
The same day, the KSS-affiliated outlet also appeared to pressure the Iraqi government to address intensified Turkish kinetic operations in Northern Iraq:
(Figure 14) Sentiment Analysis: KSS-affiliated Al Anwar TV criticizes Baghdad’s response to Turkish military expansion
It also reported on PKK counterstrikes on a Turkish military base in Iraq, seemingly emphasizing the PKK’s sophisticated military capabilities:
(Figure 15) Sentiment Analysis: KSS-affiliated Al Anwar TV highlights Kurdish attacks on Turkish military base
Overall, Al Anwar TV’s reporting indicates that KSS sees Turkey as a particularly critical threat and is actively shaping narratives to portray Turkey as a destabilizing force in Iraq and Syria. The allegations of Turkish collaboration with ISIS and the amplification of PKK counterstrikes suggest that KSS is not only seeking to delegitimize Turkey’s military presence but also to spark fear among Iraqis and justify potential retaliatory action. Moreover, its criticisms of Baghdad’s response indicate that KSS will oppose any actions by Sudani’s government to strengthen ties with Turkey. The fact that other AOR militia-affiliated sources did not amplify such narratives on February 8th signals hesitancy on the part of more moderate CF-affiliated AOR militias such as Badr to directly criticize Sudani’s governance, suggesting a strategic effort to balance their pro-Iran alignment with maintaining political favor in Baghdad.
3. Pro-Iran sources initially focused their efforts on delegitimizing the new regime but later emphasized diplomatic engagement following HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa’s official appointment as Syrian interim president. In January, pro-Iran sources consistently highlighted both verified and unverified claims of minority targeting by forces affiliated with HTS. For example:
HaN-run Al Nujaba TV emphasizes malnutrition affecting Syrian civilians, using strong terms to frame this narrative as a broader indictment of “global governance” and capitalism. This narrative strategically implies that Western geopolitical interests take precedence over human welfare:
(Figure 16) Sentiment Analysis: HaN-run Al Nujaba TV highlights humanitarian crisis in Syria
Iranian state-run outlet Press TV Iraq condemns mass executions carried out by HTS against former Assad loyalists, portraying these killings as part of a broader pattern of violence and persecution under the new Syrian regime. This narrative aims to paint a picture of systemic lawlessness in HTS-controlled areas and highlights the targeting of civilians–particularly religious minorities–to reinforce the idea that HTS is a destabilizing force:
(Figure 17) Sentiment Analysis: Iranian outlet Press TV Iraq criticizes HTS executions of former Assad loyalists
Pro-Iran sources such as Buratha News, KSS-affiliated iNews, and AAH-affiliated Al Ahad also make extensive use of the encrypted social media platform Telegram to post disturbing photos and videos depicting real and alleged minority targeting in Syria. These posts are often captioned with terms intended to provoke fear, such as “field executions” and “genocide”. These posts also often reference Turkish backing, representing a convergence of narrative framing strategies:
(Figure 18) Pro-Iran Telegram Posts criticizing minority targeting in Syria
Many of these narratives directly target Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. For example, KSS-affiliated Al Anwar TV critiques Arab media for allegedly sanitizing Sharaa’s image by ignoring his jihadist past. The underlying implication of this narrative is that Western and Gulf states are manipulating narratives to legitimize HTS factions:
(Figure 19) Sentiment Analysis: KSS-affiliated Al Anwar TV criticizes Ahmed al-Sharaa
Overall, sources run by/affiliated with pro-Iran AOR militias follow somewhat divergent amplification patterns in their coverage of developments in Syria, potentially indicating failure of Iraqi AOR militias to agree upon a coordinated media strategy:
(Figure 20) Timeline: Militia-Affiliated Narrative Amplifications on Syria
Several insights can be drawn from Iraqi AOR narrative amplification patterns. The spike in reporting on Syria by Badr-run Al Ghadeer around January 12th coincides with the deployment of Badr-affiliated PMF units to work on fortifying the Iraqi-Syrian border. The overall spike around January 19th coincides with PMF operations targeting smugglers on the Iraqi-Syrian border. The most interesting spike in reporting occurred around January 30th, when Sharaa was officially appointed Syria’s interim president. Iraqi AOR media coverage of Syria declined significantly after Sharaa’s appointment, with AAH-run Al Ahad pausing coverage completely. This indicates that the previous narrative focus on civilian suffering and instability may represent a failed attempt to thwart the transition. However, once Sharaa officially assumed power, continued coverage risked normalizing his government’s authority. AAH’s relative silence following Sharaa’s appointment as Syrian interim president may indicate a strategic pause as Tehran recalibrates its approach to the new Syrian leadership, weighing whether to engage diplomatically, maintain a distance, or seek to undermine the interim government’s authority through alternative means. Following January 30th, other pro-Iran sources highlighted Iran’s desire to establish positive relations with the Syrian interim government. For example:
Iranian state-run outlet Press TV Iraq praised Iran’s “pragmatism” in communicating with the Syrian interim government:
(Figure 21) Sentiment Analysis: Iranian outlet Press TV Iraq reports on relations between Tehran and Damascus
KSS-affiliated iNews amplified a statement from the Iranian foreign ministry supporting any Syrian government with “popular backing”:
(Figure 22) Sentiment Analysis: KSS-affiliated iNews reports on Iranian support for the Syrian democratic process
Badr-run Al Ghadeer appears to present Syria’s transition under Sharaa in a somewhat positive light, emphasizing efforts to establish a legislative council and foster national dialogue. This narrative frames the move as a crucial step toward Syrian unity and structured governance, suggesting optimism about Syria’s post-conflict stability:
(Figure 23) Sentiment Analysis: Badr-run Al Ghadeer reports positive outlook on Syria’s transition
On February 17th, HaN-run Al Nujaba TV emphasized Iraq’s “non-interventionist stance” toward Syria, highlighting Iraq’s role as a mediator in upcoming Arab League discussions on the Syrian transition:
(Figure 24) Sentiment Analysis: HaN-run Al Nujaba TV highlights Iraq’s mediating role in Syria’s transition
This shift in narrative framing may represent a strategic pause as a weakened Iran assesses the vulnerabilities of the interim government and its willingness to offer concessions before committing to a strategy of outright kinetic opposition using its proxies. It characterizes Tehran as open to engagement with the new regime, yet preserves Tehran’s flexibility to pivot toward kinetic opposition should Damascus refuse dialogue or concessions. This narrative allows Tehran to maintain the appearance of exploring diplomatic avenues while discreetly gathering intelligence and devising strategies to potentially subvert the new regime. Its emphasis on pragmatism and national dialogue thus suggests a broader effort to assess and adapt to Syria’s new reality while potentially leveraging Baghdad as a mediator.
Popular Iraqi Sunni outlet Al Baghdadia frames the shift in Syrian refugees' willingness to return home as a significant positive indicator of improving political conditions in Syria. This narrative suggests growing optimism surrounding Syria’s long-term stability:
(Figure 25) Sentiment Analysis: Sunni Outlet Al Baghdadia highlights Syrian refugee returns
Liberal Iraqi outlet Al Jeebal highlights Sharaa’s commitment and pragmatic approach to fostering inclusivity both in Syria’s new government and its security forces. This narrative portrays Sharaa as a pragmatic leader willing to integrate different factions into a cohesive national framework:
(Figure 26) Sentiment Analysis: Liberal outlet Al Jeebal highlights Sharaa’s push for inclusive governance
Al Jeebal also celebrates Syria’s shift in governance priorities, with the leadership emphasizing institutional stability over territorial control of resources like oil. In stark contrast to pro-Iran sources, Al Jeebal characterizes the role of the US and Turkey as crucial in facilitating a stable Syrian transition:
(Figure 27) Sentiment Analysis: Liberal outlet Al Jeebal on Syria’s Institutional Priorities Over Resource Control
Liberal Iraqi outlet Al Mada frames Sharaa’s transition from a fighter to a political leader as a testament to personal growth and adaptability in times of conflict. This narrative counters those pushed by pro-Iran sources by portraying Sharaa as a leader who “learns from his mistakes”, a reference to his jihadist past:
(Figure 28) Sentiment Analysis: Liberal outlet Al Mada celebrates Sharaa’s Leadership Transformation
Sunni and liberal Iraqi sources are reactive to political maneuvers by Tehran-aligned factions. For example, the CF recently lobbied for the suspension of Iraq’s General Amnesty law. The law dictates that Iraqis convicted of terrorism–most of whom are Sunni–can request a retrial if they allege a confession was extracted under duress. Days before the Iraqi Supreme Court suspended the law on February 4th, Afaq, a news outlet affiliated with Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, attempted to garner support for the law’s suspension:
(Figure 29) Sentiment Analysis: Pro-Maliki outlet Afaq criticizes Iraq’s General Amnesty law
However, Sunni outlets defended the law as a remedy to address judicial injustices. One particularly outspoken source is Al Baghdadia, a popular Iraqi-owned Sunni news outlet headquartered in Cairo. Al Baghdadia’s offices in Iraq were shut down by the CMC in 2023 for “violation of broadcasting regulations and lack of required security approvals”. The outlet utilized particularly strong language in criticizing Maliki’s actions:
(Figure 30) Sentiment Analysis: Iraqi Sunni outlet Al Baghdadia condemns Maliki’s statements
Other Sunni and liberal sources criticized Maliki’s February 1st speech in which he stated: "In Syria, Shias have been targeted, and every day we see videos of massacres against them," said Maliki. "Our brothers in Syria are sending videos pleading, asking: Where are Iraq’s Shias, the Popular Mobilization Forces, Iran, and the tribes?"
(Figure 31) Speech: Maliki urges Iraqi intervention in Syria
The New Arab, a Qatari-owned news outlet, depicted these comments in a similarly negative light, framing them as “election propaganda”. The outlet appeared to subtly mock Maliki’s age and his attempt to employ dated rhetoric from his previous tenure as Prime Minister:
(Figure 32) Article Excerpt from Qatari outlet The New Arab dismissing Maliki’s statements
Liberal sources such as Al Mada mirrored Sunni sources in their condemnation of Maliki’s statements, accusing him of exaggerating external threats to deflect attention away from domestic issues:
(Figure 33) Sentiment Analysis: Liberal Iraqi outlet Al Mada criticizes Maliki’s statements on General Amnesty
Interestingly, EdgeTheory’s sentiment analysis revealed that some purportedly neutral sources such as Noon News Agency provided positive coverage of Maliki’s statements:
(Figure 34) Sentiment Analysis: “Neutral” Iraqi outlet Noon News Agency supports Maliki’s statements
In fact, Noon News Agency amplified the second-highest number of narrative items surrounding Maliki, following Maliki himself. Its amplification patterns suggest either covert alignment with CF messaging strategies or external pressure to promote narratives that support Maliki’s initiatives.
(Figure 35) “Neutral” Iraqi outlet Noon News Agency Telegram Bio
Sunni and liberal Iraqi sources strongly opposed the suspension of Iraq’s General Amnesty Law, framing it as an attack on Sunni detainees' rights, while sources aligned with former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki advocated for its repeal, citing security concerns. Maliki’s camp lobbied for the law’s suspension ahead of the Supreme Court’s ruling on February 4th. Sunni sources condemned Maliki’s stance, characterizing it as sectarian and politically motivated. Meanwhile, liberal outlets dismissed Maliki’s February 1st speech calling for Iraqi intervention in Syria as outdated rhetoric. Interestingly, some purportedly neutral outlets provided positive coverage of Maliki’s statements, suggesting that smaller Iraqi media outlets may be under pressure from the CMC to provide positive coverage of CF initiatives. Alternatively, CF factions may be more adept at establishing informal media influence networks than previously assumed.
As Iraq navigates the fallout of Syria’s sudden regime change, pro-Iran media sources have worked to shape Iraqi public perception by amplifying narratives that legitimize AOR PMF militias, stoke fears of Sunni jihadism, and frame Western and Turkish influence as destabilizing. On the other hand, Sunni and liberal sources challenge Iran’s influence by portraying Syria’s transition as a step toward stability and regional reintegration. This growing divergence in narrative framing suggests increasing competition for influence in Iraq’s information space. But how do pro-Iran amplification patterns evolve in response to shifting regional dynamics? Are these narratives part of a cohesive strategy, or do they reveal deeper fractures among pro-Iran factions that could be leveraged?
In part two of this report, we will take a closer look at pro-Iran amplification patterns and analyze important divergences as Iraqi AOR militias recalibrate their response to the evolving security situation in Syria. Comparing these trends can provide deeper insights into how different actors attempt to shape Iraqi public discourse and reveal potential vulnerabilities, strategic shifts, and opportunities to counter Tehran’s influence over the Iraqi media landscape. Stay tuned for part two, where we dissect the broader amplification trends and their implications for Iraq’s information environment, political stability, and regional alignments post-Assad.
Author: Peyton Day, EdgeTheory Lab
Peyton Day is an International Relations PhD candidate at the University of Mississippi and an EdgeTheory Lab research consultant for Foreign Malign Influence (FMI). With demonstrated experience conducting synthetic OSINT intelligence analysis and forecasting on Iranian proxy behavior, Day’s empirical research focuses on how globalization has transformed the way armed-groups procure resources to subsidize their operations. She specializes in network-based approaches aimed at identifying key patterns and influential players within armed groups' logistical support apparatuses and resource supply chains. At EdgeTheory, Day is responsible for facilitating narrative intelligence analysis through MENA source discovery, refining source auditing methodology, and producing in-depth analytic content focused on FMI.
