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Xi's PLA Purge and the Looming Invasion of Taiwan

February 3, 2026Ellie Munshi

This EdgeTheory report synthesizes geospatial, narrative attribution, and network analysis surrounding Chinese military activity around Taiwan in late December 2025 and early January 2026, with a focus on the large-scale "Justice Mission 2025" exercises.

Drawing from multi-platform collection streams—including websites, social media actors, RSS feeds, and X posts—the brief maps how competing narratives about PLA drills, deterrence signaling, sovereignty assertion, and regional escalation propagate across the global information environment.

The report employs EdgeTheory's network-detection, emotion-classification, and narrative-amplification tools to trace how state-affiliated amplifiers, Taiwan-focused security monitors, U.S.-based analysts, Russian-aligned commentators, and other actors interact and reinforce messaging. In doing so, it provides a layered view of how information power, emotional framing, and geopolitical competition intersect to shape public understanding of the exercises and the risks of broader Asia-Pacific friction.

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Preface

This EdgeTheory report synthesizes geospatial, narrative attribution, and network analysis surrounding Chinese military activity around Taiwan in late December 2025 and early January 2026, with a focus on the large-scale "Justice Mission 2025" exercises. Drawing from multi-platform collection streams—including websites, social media actors, RSS feeds, and X posts—the brief maps how competing narratives about PLA drills, deterrence signaling, sovereignty assertion, and regional escalation propagate across the global information environment. The report employs EdgeTheory's network-detection, emotion-classification, and narrative-amplification tools to trace how state-affiliated amplifiers, Taiwan-focused security monitors, U.S.-based analysts, Russian-aligned commentators, and other actors interact and reinforce messaging. In doing so, it provides a layered view of how information power, emotional framing, and geopolitical competition intersect to shape public understanding of the exercises and the risks of broader Asia-Pacific friction.

Introduction 

Beginning in late December 2025, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command initiated its largest-ever military exercises code-named "Justice Mission 2025" around Taiwan. These drills, featuring live-fire activities, encirclement tactics, blockade rehearsals, and joint operations across air, sea, and rocket forces, prompted immediate condemnation from Taipei as "military intimidation" and heightened regional tensions. What began as a rapid, short-duration operation quickly became a focal point in the information space, with PRC state media and aligned actors framing the exercises as defensive responses to "Taiwan independence" forces and external interference (particularly U.S. arms sales), while Taiwanese, U.S., and allied sources portrayed them as escalatory gray-zone coercion and tests of resolve. This contested narrative landscape—shaped by social media virality, influencer amplification, and strategic messaging—complicates independent assessment of the drills' scale, intent, and implications for cross-strait stability.

Key Findings

  1. Justice Mission 2025 represents a qualitative escalation through normalization, not preparation for immediate invasion.

The PLA’s largest-ever exercises around Taiwan compressed the timeline between announcement, maneuver, and live-fire activity, integrating encirclement geometry, blockade rehearsal, and joint fires in rapid sequence. This signals a shift from symbolic deterrence to operational readiness demonstrations, while the absence of large-scale amphibious mobilization indicates coercive pressure and normalization—not imminent kinetic action—as the primary objective.

  1. Military operations and information operations are deliberately synchronized to legitimize sustained coercion.

PLA actions were consistently paired with narrative framing that portrayed the drills as lawful, defensive, and reactive to “Taiwan independence” and U.S. interference. State-affiliated and aligned influencers amplified this framing across global information networks, externalizing blame and conditioning domestic, regional, and international audiences to accept high-intensity PLA activity around Taiwan as routine and justified.

  1. Emotional and influencer-driven narratives significantly shaped global threat perception despite stable ground truths.

While open-source and official reporting converged on the reality that the drills were assertive but limited in duration, information ecosystems amplified fear, anger, and geopolitical polarization. Russia-aligned and PRC-affiliated commentators reframed the exercises as restrained counter-pressure, while Taiwanese and Western analysts emphasized gray-zone coercion and psychological warfare—demonstrating how information power now plays a decisive role alongside military signaling in Taiwan Strait stability.

Narrative Infographics: GEOINT & Data Analysis

Geospatial Narrative Sources (yellow) and targets (red)

The narrative initially emerged from Istanbul, headed for Taiwan. As it spread, the most frequent origin shifted to New Delhi, and the most frequent destination shifted to Taipei. There are a total of 25 points of origin, and 10 destinations. The amplified narrative content predominantly focuses on China's large-scale military drills around Taiwan, named "Justice Mission 2025," emphasizing live-fire exercises, encirclement tactics, and combat readiness to deter Taiwan independence and foreign interference, especially U.S. arms sales. These actions have significantly escalated regional tensions, drawing condemnation from Taiwan and criticism from the EU. Additionally, China’s broader foreign policy themes include defending national sovereignty, contesting recognition of Somaliland by Israel, and conducting joint naval drills with Russia and Iran in South Africa. The consistent thread is China asserting military strength and sovereignty amidst geopolitical friction in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.

EdgeTheory’s Narrative Intelligence platform tracked narratives stemming from websites, social media actors, and RSS feeds. Influential social media actors shaping narratives around China’s “Justice Mission 2025” military exercises include a mix of PLA-adjacent amplifiers, Taiwan-focused security monitors, U.S.-based China analysts, and Russian actors, each reinforcing distinct strategic frames.

One prominent amplifier is China Military Bugle (@ChinaMilBugle), a PLA-adjacent military tracking account with a sizable international following. The account consistently echoes Beijing-aligned framing by portraying Justice Mission 2025 as a measured and defensive response to “external interference” in the Taiwan Strait. Its posts emphasize scale, coordination, and deterrence value, repeatedly asserting that the drills are “not routine” and are intended to signal resolve rather than provoke conflict. By foregrounding sovereignty language and externalizing blame, the account normalizes escalation while framing responsibility as lying with foreign actors and Taiwanese authorities. Its content circulates widely among China-watching defense communities and is frequently referenced in Western OSINT and military analysis threads.

K. Tristan Tang (@KTristanTang), is a defense analyst whose posts frame Justice Mission 2025 as part of an incremental shift in PLA operational doctrine rather than a symbolic show of force. His commentary emphasizes blockade rehearsal, command-and-control integration, and joint-firepower sequencing, reinforcing a narrative that the drills reflect capability maturation. This framing shapes discourse among U.S. and allied security audiences by treating the exercise as evidence of long-term planning rather than imminent conflict.

J. Michael Cole (@J_Michael_Cole), a Taiwan-based security analyst, frames Justice Mission 2025 as psychological and political warfare as much as a military exercise. His posts emphasize signaling toward Taiwanese domestic audiences and foreign policymakers, portraying the drills as an attempt to erode confidence in Taiwan’s security environment over time. This narrative positions the exercise within Beijing’s broader gray-zone strategy rather than as preparation for near-term kinetic action.

X post by Li Zexin

The post by Li Zexin (@XH_Lee23) in May 2024 captured significant attention because it reflected widespread nationalist pride in China's Joint Sword-2024A military drills around Taiwan—launched as a direct "punishment" for President William Lai's inauguration speech seen as pro-independence. By emphasizing "A weak country has no diplomacy" and contrasting China's restrained rise with U.S. interventions, the post articulated a core rationale for Beijing's increasingly assertive posture: displaying military strength deters perceived provocations and safeguards sovereignty without aggressive global overreach.

X post by XYang Liu

This post from @Ff2Jj7zYXCocMzK (XYang Liu) holds significance as it directly quotes and disseminates a recent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) report claiming that People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft incursions around Taiwan have surged nearly 15-fold over the past five years—from about 380 sorties in 2020 to over 5,700 in 2025. The report frames these incursions as deliberate "gray-zone operations" designed to test deterrence, exhaust Taiwan's defense resources, and incrementally shift security boundaries.

Edge Theory Emotion-Profile Classifier

Across the emotion profiles in the X posts related to China's "Justice Mission 2025" military drills around Taiwan from late December 2025 into January 2026, sentiments overwhelmingly emphasize negative emotions like anger and fear, creating a charged atmosphere that exploits outrage and anxiety to fuel narratives of deterrence, sovereignty defense, and geopolitical tension.

Adversarial narratives in China–Taiwan tensions, particularly those high on anger, frame Beijing as an aggressive bully deliberately escalating coercion through repeated incursions, median-line violations, and gray-zone tactics aimed at wearing down Taiwan's resolve and undermining regional stability. Examples include WION's January 18 report of Taiwan detecting nine Chinese military aircraft and ships crossing into its air defense zone (79% anger) and the January 27 coverage of Taiwan conducting large-scale land, water, and air drills in response to mounting Chinese pressure (66% anger). These stories emphasize Taiwan's defiant response—scrambling fighters, deploying drones and missiles, and vowing protection—positioning the island as a resilient victim standing up to unjustified intimidation.

Coverage often amplifies this framing through language that condemns China's "provocative" and "escalatory" behavior while downplaying Beijing's claims of routine sovereignty patrols or defensive training. In contrast, high-fear narratives, such as the January 26 story on Taipei closely watching Beijing amid a probe into China's top general (91% fear), the January 29 live-fire drill repelling a simulated invasion (83% fear), the January 31 discussion of Taiwan as a potential center of conflict or forced unification (74% fear), and the January 9 report on Chinese, Russian, and Iranian warships drilling in South Africa (84% fear), adopt a more ominous, anxiety-driven tone focused on uncertainty, internal Chinese turmoil, looming escalation risks, and broader global power shifts that could destabilize the Taiwan Strait, evoking passive dread about potential invasion or chaos rather than active outrage at specific aggressions; anger-heavy accounts are typically more confrontational and partisan (often from outlets critical of the CCP), while fear-heavy ones lean toward analytical warnings of instability without the same level of direct condemnation.

Chinese Military Activity Around Taiwan

China has initiated its largest-ever military exercises, code-named “Justice Mission 2025,” around Taiwan, escalating regional tensions. The drills, designed to display Beijing's military strength, are closely watched for their impact on Asia-Pacific security. These military drills, including live-fire exercises near Taiwan, prompted Taipei’s condemnation. Taiwan subsequently deployed forces and called China’s actions “military intimidation.”  The drills aimed to safeguard China's sovereignty, deter separatists, and promote reunification.

Several ground truths can be established regarding Chinese military activity around Taiwan.

First, escalation is observable not simply in the scale of force deployed, but in the compression of time between announcement, maneuver, and live-fire activity, indicating a reduced separation between training and operational execution. Unlike earlier PLA exercises that emphasized signaling through presence alone, Justice Mission 2025 integrates encirclement geometry, exclusion zones, and live-fire components in rapid sequence, demonstrating readiness to transition from demonstration to action without extended warning periods. This shift marks a qualitative escalation in posture rather than a purely quantitative increase in activity.

Second, PRC intent can be inferred through the convergence of military activity and narrative framing. The exercises consistently pair operational actions with messaging that portrays them as lawful, defensive, and reactive—particularly in response to Taiwan independence signaling and U.S. arms sales. This alignment suggests the intent is not immediate invasion, but the normalization of coercive pressure as a standing condition. The drills operationalize deterrence by conditioning regional and domestic audiences to accept PLA proximity and high-intensity activity around Taiwan as routine, thereby lowering the psychological and political threshold for future escalation.

Third, the PLA units involved provide additional clarity on intent. The exercises are led by the Eastern Theater Command, with coordinated participation from PLA Navy surface combatants, naval aviation units, PLA Air Force strike and ISR elements, and Rocket Force assets during live-fire phases. The integration of maritime law-enforcement forces alongside military units further reinforces the hybrid nature of the operation, blending military signaling with governance and legal assertion. Notably absent, however, is evidence of sustained forward deployment of large-scale amphibious assault formations or logistics mobilization consistent with imminent invasion, indicating that the exercise prioritizes coercive capability demonstration over immediate kinetic action.

The Edge Agent later went on to say:

“Specifically, the presence of amphibious assault ship formations, destroyers, frigates, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) shows that the PLA is preparing for a coordinated maritime and amphibious operation, potentially enabling complex encirclement and control of key maritime routes and ports. Meanwhile, the deployment of missile units capable of precision strikes and the Rocket Force's participation underscore the intent to conduct rapid, targeted strikes against critical military infrastructure and symbolic leadership targets (decapitation strikes).

The use of drones and robot dogs alongside traditional forces reflects a modernization focus, integrating new technologies to enhance battlefield efficiency and sustain surveillance and perimeter security in high-intensity conflict scenarios.

However, while the scope and scale of the PLA’s drills are significant and showcase high-intensity combat scenarios, the exercises stop short of full-scale invasion simulations. The focus on blockades, multi-wave strikes, and decapitation targets suggests that Beijing aims to exert pressure, demonstrate resolve, and enforce isolation of Taiwan without immediately crossing the threshold into outright invasion.

The absence of a clear amphibious landing or occupation scenario, despite amphibious assets being exercised, suggests a posture more calibrated toward signaling readiness to escalate and imposing costs on Taiwan independence activities rather than immediate war. This aligns with a strategic doctrine of coercion without direct conflict, whereby China seeks to leverage military pressure, economic and diplomatic tools, and hybrid warfare tactics to achieve political objectives while avoiding triggering full-scale war.

In summary, the composition of forces signals a comprehensive, ready military posture designed to enforce blockade and perform precision strikes, conveying a serious threat that falls short of immediate invasion, thus reflecting a calibrated escalation aimed at deterrence and coercion.”

Finally, the reported political sidelining and disciplinary pressure surrounding senior PLA figures—most notably speculation about the weakening or potential purge of Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia—adds an internal civil–military dimension to the timing and character of Justice Mission 2025. Whether or not General Zhang Youxia’s position has been formally resolved, the broader pattern of leadership scrutiny and anti‑corruption enforcement within the PLA reinforces Xi Jinping’s imperative to consolidate centralized control, ensure loyalty, and shape combat readiness under his personal authority. Analysts note that the removal of experienced commanders like Zhang and Joint Staff Department chief Liu Zhenli has created short‑term disruptions in senior command experience.

These disruptions could delay complex joint war planning or degrade immediate invasion readiness against Taiwan, with some experts arguing that they may push back any near‑term timeline for large‑scale offensive action. However, the purge also signals tighter political control and the elevation of loyalists, potentially increasing the frequency and audacity of military posturing around Taiwan as successors seek to demonstrate fealty and operational competence under Xi’s strategic objectives. As a result, while the PLA’s short-term capacity for a full-scale invasion may be constrained, Beijing will likely continue to conduct coordinated, high-profile exercises and displays of force around Taiwan, maintaining pressure on Taipei without necessarily signaling an imminent offensive. In this sense, Justice Mission 2025 functions both as a coercive message to Taiwan and regional actors and as a high-visibility demonstration of discipline and Party control within the PLA during a period of strategic and political uncertainty

Weibo video post on Justice-Mission 2025

If the Water is Still’s Weibo analysis post plays a strategic legitimization role by presenting the exercise as swift, precise, and decisively targeted against “external interference,” rather than Taiwan itself. By stressing the short notice, joint-force mobilization, and “blitzkrieg-style” deployment, the post reinforces an image of high PLA readiness and technological maturity, particularly through references to air and naval encirclement patterns and increased patrol frequencies.

Crucially, the post highlights symbolic escalation, such as explicitly marking a U.S. C-130 silhouette, as a deliberate narrative shift from implicit to overt attribution of responsibility. This supports a broader storyline that links “Taiwan independence” forces directly to foreign powers, thereby justifying future escalation under the logic of counter-intervention. By concluding with language that frames unification as irreversible and resistance as futile, the post contributes to psychological pressure operations aimed at both domestic and cross-strait audiences, reinforcing the perception that time, legality, and momentum are firmly on Beijing’s side.

Taiwan Security Monitor Post

The Taiwan Security Monitor post includes the “Complete unification of the Motherland” graphic aboard a PLAN vessel—to underscore the ideological goal behind the exercise. By highlighting the explicit reunification slogan rather than operational details, the post reframes the drill as a political-military declaration rather than a neutral training event. This reframing is particularly effective for international and Taiwanese audiences, as it visually links PLA activity to an uncompromising end state, contradicting China’s claims that such exercises are purely deterrent or reactive. Chinese sources, by contrast, present the unification narrative as a purely internal matter, emphasizing legality and restraint. Taiwanese sources portray the island’s perspective as cautious, skeptical, and defensive, viewing China’s recent military maneuvers not as routine drills but as escalatory behavior signaling mounting PLA ambition and potential threat. Concurrently, US sources emphasize on Washington’s support for Taiwan’s self‑defense capacity, framing PLA activity as a test of U.S. resolve and regional stability.

The post functions as evidentiary material in countering Beijing’s ambiguity strategy. While official Chinese messaging often emphasizes restraint and legality, the highlighted imagery supports interpretations that the exercise is part of a sustained psychological and political campaign aimed at normalizing Taiwan’s reunification as inevitable. Circulated by a Taiwan-focused security account, the post reinforces threat perception in Taiwan and among allied observers, while also feeding into broader debates about whether PLA signaling has shifted from coercive ambiguity to increasingly explicit intent.

Weibo Post on Justice Mission 2025

Uncle Asked Dao’s Weibo post functions as a key domestic narrative accelerator by reframing the exercise not as routine training, but as a qualitative escalation in readiness and intent. By emphasizing the immediate transition to live-fire drills and the metaphor of “choking the throat” via High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) interdiction, the post normalizes the idea that PLA exercises are no longer preparatory rehearsals but integrated components of real-world contingency planning. The framing collapses the distinction between exercise and combat preparation, reinforcing the message that military action around Taiwan can occur with little warning and should be understood as an ongoing, normalized condition rather than an exceptional crisis. Simultaneously, the post aligns military signaling with law-enforcement and propaganda elements—specifically the China Coast Guard’s “Choke Throat” poster linking HIMARS to an Evergreen container ship—thereby constructing a narrative of legitimate, proportionate response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. This fusion of military, legal, and economic imagery strengthens Beijing’s preferred storyline: that coercive actions around Taiwan are defensive, rules-based, and reactive rather than aggressive. As such, the post helps socialize domestic audiences to the idea that escalation is both lawful and inevitable, while pre-emptively framing international criticism as unreasonable interference. This pattern of normalization and defensive framing is reinforced across X/Twitter posts from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, state media, and international reporting of China’s critiques, which present the drills as lawful deterrence against “Taiwan independence” forces and frame external criticism as unreasonable interference (MFA China 1,MFA China 2,China Daily,Bloomberg post).

Conclusion

The "Justice Mission 2025" exercises illustrate how modern military signaling is conducted simultaneously in operational and information domains. While PLA capability demonstration and coercive normalization remain core drivers, the global narrative battle has profoundly shaped perceptions of intent, threat, and stability. Negative emotional framing, influencer amplification, and polarized ecosystems have deepened mistrust, distorted emphases, and provided rhetorical cover for sustained pressure. Absent de-escalatory measures or reduced external frictions, the Taiwan Strait remains vulnerable to recurring cycles of assertive drills and countermeasures, with future trajectories determined as much by information power as by kinetic developments. This report demonstrates that narrative intelligence tools can accurately reveal ground truths of the exercises while exposing how actors manipulate perceptions—essential for formulating balanced deterrence, diplomacy, and response strategies

Lead Analyst:

Ellie Munshi is an analyst at the EdgeTheory Lab. She is studying Strategic Intelligence in National Security and Economics at Patrick Henry College. She has led special projects for the college focused on Anti-Human Trafficking, Chinese influence in Africa, AI influence on policymakers, and was also an intelligence analyst intern at the Department of War.

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