Preface

The Coordinating Framework has nominated former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki as the next prime minister. The Coordinating Framework (CF), a coalition of Shi’a parties that includes parties linked to Iran, nominated Al-Maliki for a third term on 24 January, though several CF leaders, including Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais Al-Khazali, Al-Hikma Movement leader Ammar Al-Hakim, former Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, and Labor and Social Affairs Minister Ahmad Al-Asadi reportedly opposed the nomination (1). Incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani, whose Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC) won the most seats in November’s elections, withdrew from the premiership running on 11 January (2). Note that Edge Theory previously predicted Al-Sudani was unlikely to retain the position, as several CF parties, including those linked to Iran-backed militias, disliked Al-Sudani’s willingness to act counter to their interests during his first term. 

Narrative volume spiked on 24 January when the CF nominated former PM Al-Maliki for a third term. 

Al-Maliki’s nomination is not a guarantee that he will serve for a third term. Multiple factors beyond internal CF opposition to his nomination may prevent Al-Maliki from serving another term. First, President Trump stated on 27 January that the US would “no longer help” Iraq if Al-Maliki becomes the next premier (3). Al-Maliki condemned the US’ “blatant interference in Iraq’s internal affairs” in response (4). As of 2 February, the CF appears to be standing behind Al-Maliki as the nominee, despite reported disagreements and concerns within the CF regarding the potential international “isolation” this may cause (5). Second, other political actors outside the CF oppose Al-Maliki’s nomination. On 27 January, the Sunni party with the most seats, the Taqadum Party, stated they would not participate in a government led by figures that would “revive sectarian divisions,” likely a reference to the sectarian, anti-Sunni policies Al-Maliki pursued during his tenure (6). Third, Al-Sudani, despite his 12 January withdrawal, may still assess that he has a chance of obtaining the premiership. When Al-Sudani withdrew, he reportedly stated Al-Maliki must gain the approval of Shi’a cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, the premier religious authority within Twelver Shi’a Islam, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, and Sunni and Kurdish political parties (7). Al-Sudani likely suspected that Al-Maliki would not meet these conditions, particularly given Al-Sadr’s well-known, longstanding opposition to Al-Maliki (8). 

Among outlets monitored by Edge Theory, narratives discussing the CF retaining Al-Maliki as the premier nominee leveraged the highest proportion of language evoking sadness and anger. This specific narrative describes how, following a 31 January meeting, the CF issued a statement reiterating its “adherence” to Al-Maliki as the premier nominee despite US pressure to drop Al-Maliki. The CF also conveyed its “commitment to building balanced relations with the international community” in the statement, however. The high “anger” rating this narrative incurred may reflect both negative public sentiment towards Al-Maliki and potentially opposition to a third Al-Maliki term within Iraq’s political parties.

What’s next? Iraq’s constitution requires that parliament elect a president before confirming a prime minister (9). That election was constitutionally required to occur by 28 January, but has been postponed as the two main Kurdish parties negotiate over which party will control the presidency (which is traditionally held by a Kurd) (10). In addition, on 27 January, the CF reportedly submitted a request to Supreme Judicial Council head Faiq Zaydan regarding the possibility of holding the parliamentary session to elect the president at a later date-possibly to allow Al-Maliki’s Coordinating Framework supporters time to reach a deal with one of the Kurdish parties, and other parties, in exchange for their support of Al-Maliki (11). Al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition may also be using threats to reach a deal: on 30 January, a State of Law Coalition member of parliament appeared to threaten to attempt to remove parliament speaker Haibat Al-Halbousi if his cousin, Taqadum Party leader Mohammed Al-Halbousi, does not support Al-Maliki’s premiership bid (12). 

Narratives discussing the postponement of the parliamentary session to elect a president leveraged a high proportion of language evoking sadness. Both negotiations between the Kurdish parties and disagreements about Al-Maliki’s nomination are likely fueling the postponements. Iraqi News published the two narratives shown above. No information on Iraqi News’ ownership is publicly available, but both narratives’ author, Jawad Al-Samarraie, is an American University of Iraq-Baghdad graduate and former participant in the State Department’s Iraqi Young Leaders Exchange program. While it is possible the “sadness” score reflects Al-Samarraie’s personal views, it is more likely that the Iraqi public may view government formation delays negatively in general, regardless of who they support for the presidency or premiership.

Al-Maliki fled Iraq under the Ba’ath regime due to his membership in the Islamic Dawa Party, a Shi’a Islamist party that was outlawed due to its opposition to the regime. During Al-Maliki’s exile, he lived in Syria, but temporarily resided in Iran, reportedly in a Dawa-run military camp outside of Ahvaz, from 1981-1999 (13). Al-Maliki returned to Iraq in 2003 after the US ousted Hussein. Beyond this personal history, Al-Maliki has shown a dangerous willingness to advance Iranian interests if doing so allows him to consolidate his own power. As Iraq’s security situation worsened in the lead up to ISIS’ rise, Al-Maliki incorporated units from Iraq’s Special Groups-Shi’a Islamist paramilitary cells trained and funded by Iran, some of which fought for Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, and which fought US forces following the invasion-under the Prime Minister’s command alongside conventional Iraqi forces, increasing his own power while beginning to institutionalize Iran-backed militias’ hold on the Iraqi state. 

He demonstrated unwillingness to take action as these militias kidnapped and killed Sunni civilians amid ISIS’s takeover (14). Al-Maliki formalized the militias’ integration in 2016 by legally incorporating the Popular Mobilization Forces into Iraq’s armed forces (15). Therefore, despite Al-Maliki’s apparent December claim that he would disarm the Iran-backed militias if selected as premier, his history of empowering the militias suggests he is unlikely to do so (16). Al-Maliki is not controlled by Iran or the militias, but he has a longstanding history of working with them and a pragmatic, power-seeking governing strategy that has made him malleable to their interests in previous terms. While Iran has stopped short of publicly weighing in in favor of Al-Maliki’s nomination, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Quds Force leader Esmail Qaani reportedly delivered a letter from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei offering the CF Khamenei’s “blessing” for Al-Maliki’s nomination earlier in January (17).

Al-Maliki’s mismanagement of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) led to the Iraqi Army’s collapse in the face of ISIS’s seizure of Mosul in June 2014, making him an ill-suited choice to confront the ISIS threat (albeit a diminished one) in 2026. (18). Al-Maliki made extensive changes to the ISF to consolidate his personal power, including replacing top leadership with appointees chosen for loyalty rather than competence.  Beyond this, Al-Maliki’s pursuit of sectarian policies, which spurred Sunni protests beginning in 2012 (protests Al-Maliki’s government violently suppressed) alienated Sunni Iraqis and likely bolstered ISIS’s recruitment (19). It is therefore possible that any counter-ISIS operations Iraq potentially undertakes under Al-Maliki could result in overreach and targeting of Sunni civilians. The US and Iraq can not afford a premier with Al-Maliki’s track record at such a critical transitional period in the US’ counter-ISIS mission. Two factors make this a critical moment. First, on 18 January, the Iraqi government announced that US forces had completed a “full withdrawal” from federal Iraq after the final group of US troops left Ain Al-Asad Air Base (20). In September 2024, Al-Sudani’s government and the US agreed that the US-led counter-ISIS coalition’s mission in Iraq would end by September 2025 and that the two countries would transition to a bilateral security partnership (21). 

Second, the US is beginning the transfer of thousands of ISIS prisoners currently in northeastern Syria to Iraq amid the Ahmed Al-Sharaa government’s takeover of the region from the Syrian Democratic Forces (using both force and negotiations), which has created security gaps (22). On 19 January, prisoners escaped from Al-Shaddadi prison, which holds “thousands” of ISIS detainees, as the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MOD) sought to take over the area from the SDF. On 20 January, the SDF withdrew from Al-Hol camp, which also houses thousands of ISIS prisoners, including Syrians, Iraqis, and foreign fighters. 

Edge Theory found Iraqi media coverage discussing Al-Hol camp spiked on 20 January (left), when the SDF withdrew from the camp. In addition, among the Iraqi outlets Edge Theory monitors, Kurdish outlets (including Kurdistan Democratic Party-affiliated sources) covered Al-Hol most extensively during this period. This is unsurprising given the Kurdish SDF’s longtime administration of Al-Hol. KDP-affiliated outlets’ extensive coverage may also be unsurprising given Kurdistan Regional Government president and KDP leader Masoud Barzani’s reported facilitation of talks between the SDF and Syrian government during this period (more below). 

On 30 January, the Syrian government and the SDF reportedly reached a comprehensive agreement to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army and to transfer remaining SDF-held territory in northeastern Syria to the government. KRG president and KDP leader Masoud Barzani reportedly facilitated the agreement (24). If it holds, this agreement is likely to reduce the overall risk of disorganized prison handovers and security gaps that could aid ISIS’s reconstitution of its forces. Nonetheless, the US should not rely on Al-Maliki to effectively manage Iraq’s receipt of thousands of ISIS detainees at a time when the country no longer benefits from a dispersed US troop presence in the country. 

The narrative amplification activity surrounding the repatriation of ISIS prisoners is international in scale. 

Among the domestic media sources monitored by Edge Theory, a roughly equal distribution of Kurdish versus Iraqi sources covered narratives pertaining to ISIS prisoners’ repatriation. There may be several reasons. Iraqi Kurdish leaders have facilitated talks between the Syrian government and the SDF, which have implications for the handover of ISIS prisons in northeastern Syria and the transfer of ISIS prisoners from Syria to Iraq. In addition, the Iraqi government’s housing of ISIS prisoners pose significant security concerns for Iraqis. 

But the biggest risk of a third Al-Maliki term may be less expected: Instability. 

Al-Maliki’s CF supporters may have favored him as an alternative to Al-Sudani because he will protect their interests, is a known entity, has experience governing, and may be the candidate Iran deems the most acceptable and stable choice. 

Whether or not he succeeds in doing so, we can expect robust opposition to his government on multiple fronts. Leading Sunni politicians, including the Taqadum Party, and a significant portion of the Sunni public, would likely oppose him. The Taqadum Party may deliver on their threat not to participate in an Al-Maliki-led government. The Sunni populace (potentially spurred by Sunni political leaders) could protest, especially if Al-Maliki enacts any policies remotely resembling the sectarian policies of his initial terms. But Maliki would likely also face opposition from within the Shi’a camp if confirmed. Although Al-Sadr’s populist movement, the Shi’a Nationalist Movement (previously known as the Sadrist Movement) was sidelined from the formation of the previous government by the CF and boycotted the November elections, an Al-Maliki government may well spur Al-Sadr to return to the political sphere, to call his followers to the streets, or both. Beyond Al-Sadr, Al-Maliki could face political opposition from Shi’a parties within his own coalition.

As mentioned above, several powerful CF leaders opposed his nomination and could put up significant political opposition. Finally, Al-Maliki could trigger a resurgence of popular, civil protest across Iraq’s sects and ethnicities. To many, Al-Maliki embodies the worst flaws of Iraq’s post-2003 governance, in which an entrenched political class leverages corruption, sectarian quotas, and undue influence by foreign actors, including Iran, to pursue their own interests at Iraq’s expense.

The Iraqi public’s frustration and anger with many of these flaws drove the 2019 October Revolution Movement that triggered then-prime minister Adel Abdul Mahdi’s ouster. Iran directly intervened to suppress the 2019 protests. Now, as Iran struggled to contain its own mass protests (and will likely face additional in the future), it would likely lack the bandwidth to do so.

Looking Ahead

The CF has several choices. First, they can continue supporting Al-Maliki’s nomination, despite US pressure. While doing so might satisfy Iran and would provide Iran a time-tested regional ally as the country struggles to contain the mass protests that threaten the Iranian regime, it could risk prolonging Iraq’s government formation and triggering domestic instability on multiple fronts. Second, the CF can yield to US pressure and reconsider Al-Sudani as a more palatable option (an outcome Al-Sudani may be anticipating). However, as we previously assessed, even if the CF ultimately confirms Al-Sudani, they will likely ensure his powers as premier are tightly constrained. Third, the CF could search for a different, consensus candidate outside of both Al-Maliki and Al-Sudani. This route would likely result in a weak prime minister who lacks both Al-Sudani’s independent instincts and Al-Maliki’s power and influence. Of these three options, a second Al-Sudani term would likely best protect US interests-even if the US must contend with CF efforts to constrain Al-Sudani’s activities. 

Lead Analyst:

Ellie Munshi is an analyst at the EdgeTheory Lab. She is studying Strategic Intelligence in National Security and Economics at Patrick Henry College. She has led special projects for the college focused on Anti-Human Trafficking, Chinese influence in Africa, AI influence on policymakers, and was also an intelligence analyst intern at the Department of War.